By Hooman Majd, Politico, January 17, 2012

Top five, 10 or 100 lists are standard at the end of the year. Though the Iranian year doesn’t end for roughly two months, given the escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran, with threats and counter threats over the Strait of Hormuz — to say nothing of most GOP presidential candidates’ views on what to do about Iran — it might be useful to compile one on the growing Iran crisis, early 2012 here and late 1390 there:

1) More severe sanctions will eventually cause the regime to blink.

Um, no. Thirty-plus years of sanctions have had no effect on Tehran. None. The regime can’t blink — even if it wanted to. Not after it has spent energy, money and every tool it has convincing its people that the nuclear program is a matter of national pride, that the West wants to prevent Iranians from enjoying the fruits of technological advancement and that their suffering under the sanctions is for the country’s greater good.

The regime’s credibility has already suffered because of the opposition protests in 2009 and 2010. So what would it have left if it caved to foreign demands that even the opposition describes as unreasonable?

2) Increasing sanctions will cause the Iranian people to hate the regime even more, leading to an uprising against the ayatollahs.

No. The Iranian people may blame their government for economic mismanagement, as well as human-rights abuses — but most won’t blame it for U.S. actions. Similarly, Iranians may blame President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for exacerbating domestic problems or creating problems with the West because of his rhetoric. But they don’t blame him for, say, sanctions that prevent Tehran from buying parts for its aging airplanes, which fall out of the sky with alarming frequency.

Think about it: When a nation is attacked, or under severe external pressure, it usually blames the external enemies, not its own leaders. If you factor in the assassinations of scientists on the streets of Tehran and mysterious factory explosions, sanctions and threats may make life miserable for Iranians but are unlikely to cause them to overthrow their rulers.

3) A spark is all that’s required to ignite protests and a revolution. We will “stand” with the Iranian people.

Perhaps. And no, we won’t. But the spark cannot be a foreign one.

Iranians have never, in their more than 2,500-year history, taken the side of a foreign invader. Not even the Arabs, who invaded Persia and forced Islam on its people — which they later altered. Guess who hates the Persians more than anyone else? That’s right, the Arabs.

No, if there is change in Iran, it won’t be brought about by foreigners — or wealthy and well-connected Iranians in exile.

Most Iranians don’t believe that Washington “cares” about them or “stands with them.” After Washington’s long friendship with the shah, they’re not naive.

If America cared, Iranians reason, it wouldn’t be so cozy with dictatorships. It “stood” with Hosni Mubarak — until it decided it should “stand” with the Egyptians in Tahrir Square. It “stands” with Saudi Arabia — while Riyadh oppresses its people and sends troops to put down a popular uprising in Bahrain. Iranian TV fetishized the demonstrations and brutal suppression on that island, home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, much as the Western media fetishized Iran’s Green Movement.

4) Iran is incapable of reaching an agreement with the West over its nuclear program or its support of terrorism, for it would threaten the regime’s existence. And Iran is too politically divided to make this deal.

Many of the West’s Iran analysts and experts, both Iranian and American, assert this. Some purport to know what Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s motivation is. Curious, given that in Iran, few people make that claim — even Iranians I know who actually speak with him.

Iran has repeatedly said that it would negotiate in good faith — as long as it was respected and its rights acknowledged. Tehran’s negotiating style may be radically different from the West’s, but that doesn’t mean they don’t want talks.

Iranians are far slower and more methodical. They maneuver to stall, divide their opponents and extract the maximum concessions from rivals. But Khamenei has repeatedly said that he is not opposed to relations with the U.S. — they just can’t be solely on Washington’s terms. If they were, that would indeed threaten the regime’s credibility — and survival.

Iran’s internal opposition is also not opposed to a détente with the U.S. This could empower civil society — since it would remove the government’s major excuse for crushing dissent. But Iranians, including any viable opposition, won’t be dictated to by foreigners.

As to the deep divisions among conservatives, including the Ahmadinejad-Khamenei split — it’s still the supreme leader who makes the call on relations with the West and the nuclear program. All Iranian politicians, some of whom hate each other, fall in line.

5) All options are the table.

Let’s stop kidding. No, they’re not. War is neither a joke nor an option. It’s astonishing that politicians and presidential candidates talk about it cavalierly. If the U.S., unilaterally or with allies, attacks Iran, it will be reviled by almost all Iranians — and many others. It doesn’t matter if the attack is “surgical” — designed to minimize collateral damage. Any attack will most likely be viewed by Iranians as an attack on their sovereignty.

They will surely respond — and the response will likely be ugly. Tehran could put nuclear weapons development on a faster track while whatever opposition exists could be extinguished. Any idea of reform will disappear.

There really is only one option in dealing with Iran: negotiations and a deal that allows Iran to maintain its dignity while it de-incentivizes the building of weapons of mass destruction.

But it is difficult to negotiate with Iranians in good faith while increasing sanctions, seeking to block their source of income, assassinating scientists (though the U.S. denies any involvement, Iranians in the regime and the general public remain unconvinced) and announcing that war is an option.

As one high-ranking Iranian official said to me, “We are allergic to threats.”

Hooman Majd is the author of “The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran” and “The Ayatollahs’ Democracy: An Iranian Challenge.” He just returned from a yearlong stay in Tehran and is writing a new book about Iran.