All posts by tabsir

Qaradawi on Qaradawi

The following is a letter from Abd al-Rahman Qaradawi to his famous father, Shaykh Yusif Qaradawi, telling him to stay out of politics…

رسالة عبد الرحمن القرضاوي ابيه يوسف القرضاوي: آن لهذه الأمة أن تخوض الصعب، وأن ترسم الحدود بين ما هو ديني، وما هو سياسي، لكي نعرف متى يتحدث الفقهاء، ومتى يتحدث السياسيون!

وجه عبد الرحمن القرضاوي رسالة الى ابيه يوسف القرضاوي انتقد فيها اصداره فتوى يوم أمس بضرورة تأييد الرئيس المعزول محمد مرسي، واعادته الى منصبه، معرباً عن المه الشديد لتصرف والده ودعم الظلمة بدعوى حماية الشرعية والشريعة.

نص الرسالة كما وردت على موقع اليوم السابع:

أبي العظيم فضيلة الشيخ العلامة يوسف القرضاوى …
عرفتُكَ عالمًا جليلا وفقيهًا موسوعيًا متبحرا، تعرف أسرار الشريعة، وتقف عند مقاصدها، وتبحر في تراثها، ونحن اليوم في لحظات فاصلة في تاريخ مصر، مصر التي تحبُّها وتعتز بها، حتى إنك حين عنونت لمذكراتك اخترت لها عنوان “ابن القرية والكُتـَّــاب”ØŒ وأنا اليوم أخاطب فيك هذا المصري الذي ولد في القرية، وتربى في الكتّاب .
يا أبي الجليل العظيم … أنا تلميذك قبل أن أكون ابنك، ويبدو لي ولكثير من مريديك وتلامذتك أن اللحظة الراهنة بتعقيدها وارتباكاتها جديدة ومختلفة تماما عن تجربة جيلكم كله، ذلك الجيل الذي لم يعرف الثورات الشعبية الحقيقية، ولم يقترب من إرادة الشعوب وأفكار الشباب المتجاوزة، ولعل هذا هو السبب في أن يجري على قلمك ما لم أتعلمه أو أتربى عليه يوما من فضيلتكم .
Continue reading Qaradawi on Qaradawi →

Egypt’s second revolution: Questions of legitimacy

by Hani Shukrallah, Ahramonline, July 4, 2013

Democracy is constituted by the express and active will of real, living people, not by a box; this is especially true when these people are engaged in an on-going revolution, charting their and their nation’s future

The US government, a substantial section of mainstream Western media and the ousted Muslim Brotherhood all seem to agree: what took place in Egypt over the past few days was a military coup, a setback for the country’s alleged “transition” to democracy.

Irrespective of the variety of vested interests involved, what the three detractors of one of the most potent popular revolutionary upsurges in modern history share is contempt. Twenty-two million signatures (at nearly 50 percent of the nation’s adult population) are collected demanding the ousting of the president; the same demand is made by some 17 million people (at nearly 30 percent of the adult population) as they hit the streets throughout the country, in what has been described as the biggest demonstration in the history of mankind, and they do so against a barrage of threats and predictions warning of 30 June’s “rivers of blood,” and stay there.

Unprecedented it may be, yet not really worth seeing (the Washington Post persisted in speaking of “rival demonstrations” between Morsi supporters and the “opposition”), it is not democracy; it is the army and the “deep state.” Nothing short of the most profound sense of contempt for these very people could explain such utter blindness.

For the Muslim Brotherhood the contempt is deep-seated within a doctrine that constructs the leaders of the Gama’a as the ultimate interpreters of God’s will on earth, and as such owed blind obedience, and a lot of hand-kissing, by their “flock” – little wonder then that a rebellious Egyptian people have come to call them “sheep.”

From the Western side of the above equation – and I am still dealing here with ideological perspective rather than crass interest – it is the equally deep-seated conviction that such people as Arabs and Muslims are incapable of insisting on the sort of “liberties” that “Western Man” takes for granted.

Certainly, race has become passé, now replaced by “culture,” but what with our ostensibly inherent and immutable “Muslim” culture all we presumably can hope for is the kind of stunted and deformed “democracy” that Morsi and his tribe were offering us, never mind freedom of expression, speech, belief, assembly and protest, never mind also the frenzied power grab of Mubarak’s oligarchic and deeply authoritarian state machinery, kept fully intact but for the change of its bosses.

(In June of this year, the deposed Brotherhood president appointed in one sweep 17 new governors from among his group and its allies, a mere three months ahead of planned parliamentary elections, the better to rig them more effectively).

None of it, however, seemed to really matter, minor snags along the “transition,” since all we Arabs and Muslims could hope for and deserve is a 2 percent margin in the ballot box – that is democracy enough in terms of our “culture.”

Yet, there is another aspect to the blindness. Throughout history, popular revolutions by one people have had a tendency to inspire revolutionary upsurges by other peoples, just as Egypt’s was inspired by Tunisia’s, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria by both. For such a revolution to lead to a bungling, grimly oppressive Islamist regime, whose single claim to “democracy” is ostensibly “free and fair” elections is to drastically undercut such inspirational value. Would the Greeks find inspiration in such an outcome, or the Brazilians?

It was only on the fourth day of Egypt’s second revolution, and following intense American pressure to keep Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in power, that US President Barak Obama seemed to discover – all of a sudden – that democracy is not reducible to the ballot box.

Well, hey hurray! In fact, the history of democracy the world over is one where democratic liberties are won on the street, not the ballot box. Even if we set aside the founding democratic revolutions of the modern world, from Cromwell to Robespierre, via America’s founding fathers (beside which Egypt’s twin revolutions appear sparkling clean – “legitimacy” – wise), the extension of the franchise was won on the street, and so was the right of women to vote; trade unions, which were crucial in defining the very meaning of democracy and democratic liberties in today’s world, did not come out of the ballot box, but were born and evolved on shop-floors and on the street, and so has been the redefining of democracy in terms of women’s rights and liberation, well beyond the right to vote.

And last but not least Mr. Obama, need we remind you that the mere thought of running for office would not have occurred to you had it not been for the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Greensborro Sit-Ins, the March on Washington and the hundreds of other battles, big and small, waged with tremendous sacrifice, on the streets of the self-proclaimed “greatest democracy on earth,” by a great many people, including such “legitimacy”‐unsavory characters as Malcolm X, Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael and Angela Davis?

A very long and heroic march, full of blood and tears, put you in office Mr. Obama, and it was on the street that the heroes of these battles marched. And throughout the ballot box merely translated, almost always partially, and in stunted form, the gains won, yes, on the street.

Which seems to bring us straight back to our own erstwhile president, Dr. Morsi himself.

In his final, customarily incoherent, address to the nation, the former president (and don’t you just love the prefix “former” attached to the title of two presidents in a little over as many years) repeated the word “legitimacy” literally dozens of times. But here is a little reminder Mr. former-president, you were actually in prison when your predecessor, the “legitimate” president of the country, voted into his fourth term in what your American and other Western allies then hailed as Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential elections, was illegitimately unseated. (There was nothing in the Egyptian Constitution then in force that allowed the president to cede his powers to something called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – SCAF).

We do not know the real story behind your escape from prison, whether it was the people in charge who broke you out of it, or a Hamas contingent imported especially for that purpose, as has been suggested in recent months. And frankly, I do not care. Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were political prisoners, and in a revolution, setting political prisoners free is right and proper, even if “illegitimate.”

The thing is, of course, that since the revolution the powers that be in Egypt, hijackers all, have been juggling “revolutionary legitimacy” and formal, legal legitimacy as stipulated by the Constitution and the law of the land, willy-nilly, arbitrarily – and always in ways best tailored to suite their immediate ends. The SCAF did so, over and over again, and so did the Muslim Brotherhood.

The starkest and most flagrant example of this was the “elected” president’s flaunting of constitution, law and democratic norms, by issuing, in November 2012, a Constitutional Declaration immunising his decisions against judicial review, immunising as well that mockery of a legislative body, the consultative Shura Council (the third of which members are appointed by the president, the other two-thirds scornfully voted in by a measly 7 percent of the electorate), and vesting it meanwhile with full legislative authority, and immunising furthermore, a Constituent Assembly, which had been transformed into a closed club of the Muslim Brotherhood an its Salafi and Jihadi allies. Both these institutions had been facing imminent rulings of unconstitutionality by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court.

And what was Morsi’s justification of such draconian measures which clearly aimed at perpetuating the Muslim Brotherhood’s sway over the country until such a time as humanity meets its maker? “Revolutionary legitimacy!” Well, Mr. former-president, this is exactly what is called being “hoist by your own petard,” with the added qualification that yours’ was that of a hijacker, while the people who unseated you derived their revolutionary legitimacy from a real, living revolution, historically unprecedented by virtue of 22 million signatures, by virtue of millions on the streets.

On Democrats and Tyrants

by Corri Zoli

In principle, democratically elected officials can—and often do—become tyrants. It’s a fitting week in the U.S. to reread Madison’s Federalist Papers #10, which addressed both the tyranny of majorities and the more serious problem of tyranny of factions, when one group uses a democratic veneer to arrogate disproportionate power to their group’s narrow interests. When a new leader changes the nation’s constitution to serve that faction’s worldview, chances are we’re seeing factionalism in action. Recall that Madison thought factionalism the greatest threat to genuine republics and, thus, immunized young U.S. institutions (separate branches/balance of powers) to specifically thwart them.

Equally, militaries can defend and preserve democratic institutions and even aid democratic transitions. There is no question that 18th century rural colonial militias were at the vanguard of republican transition in US history. Even today in the U.S., where we operate by civilian control and where our military consistently garners some of the highest public opinion and respect, this institution routinely displays traits that protect democratic and constitutional values. One need only look at the record of who were the earliest, strongest critics of Bush-sponsored torture practices—Judge Advocate Attorneys (JAGs)—to see the professional, law-based culture of the military at work. Today, it is the signal intelligence captains—long trained to honor the 4th and never target Americans for surveillance—who are shocked by executive branch overreach in FISA decisions. Continue reading On Democrats and Tyrants →

The Yemen Spring nipped in the bud? Where do we go from here?


Yemen’s future; photograph by Rayman al-Hamdani

By Samira Ali BinDaair

The Yemeni version of the Arab spring has not received the attention it deserves in international media where most of the attention has been focused on reporting events and the conflicting politics of the different actors on the Yemeni scene; nothing much has been said about the dynamics of the youth revolution in the squares. The countries in the region have not taken the youth-propelled Spring seriously either, conveniently referring to it as fueled by political differences. While hundreds of youth were being brutally massacred, these nearby countries simply procrastinated in efforts to put real pressure on the regime. They played the cards they obviously held seeing that they were the financiers of the regime and the powerful tribal lords in Yemen.

In the later stage of the Spring, there were feeble attempts to persuade the regime to relent, while in another breath making it conditional upon the dismantling of the change square, so that the upheaval did not spill over the borders to ignite dormant fires, in which flames were being extinguished successfully so far. Then there was the long saga of “will he sign or will he not sign?” with the Gulf Initiative which had gone through so many changes with the claim that the red carpet had to be removed slowly lest the regime turn into a ferocious bull that might go charging and throw the country into civil war. There was some truth in that argument seeing that the regime was armed to the teeth, with the military being a family business rather than a national army for the protection of the country from outside aggression. The US in its battle with al-Qaeda had chosen Yemen as the main battleground for this, with all the paraphernalia of unmanned drones, rigorous security screening. All the while, it was training the military and supplying the most sophisticated weapons as part of its anti-terrorist agenda. Therefore to draw a parallel, the US had powerful cards to play with the regime, for as the saying goes,”he who pays the piper calls the tune”. However, despite the murmurs about the regime using the weapons intended for the fight with the al-Qaeda on Yemeni civilians, the regime suffered no penalties for such abuse. Perhaps the US too saw some advantage in keeping the power balance intact, uncertain as it was of the new emerging powers and their loyalties. Continue reading The Yemen Spring nipped in the bud? Where do we go from here? →

An Ottoman Scribe


A Seated Scribe, 1479-80, Attributed to Gentile Bellini, Italian, 1429–1507

The painting above is located in the Gardner Art Museum in Boston. Here is the description posted on their website:

Curious visitors who lift the cover from the unassuming Seated Scribe will be richly rewarded by what they see: an intimate painting in miniature of a young member of the Ottoman court bent intently over a writing pad. Dressed in a navy velvet caftan woven with gold, the elegant youth wears bright silks at his arms and neck. The generous folds of his turban hold in place a ribbed, red taj – headgear worn in the court milieu of Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (1432–1481), who nurtured a passionate interest in portraiture and particularly in western traditions of the genre.

Striking for its gleaming tones and stunning delicacy of line, the Seated Scribe is spectacular not only visually, but also in historiographic terms. The painting’s original dimensions have been trimmed, and a later hand has taken care not only to embellish the image, but also to frame, mount, and, ultimately, historicize it. An added inscription in Persian records the image as the “work of Ibn Muezzin who was a famous painter among the Franks.” Scholars have never doubted that a European or “Frankish” artist painted the Seated Scribe. The pressing issue of late has been who, precisely? Whether the Venetian Gentile Bellini, a renowned portraitist sent to Istanbul in 1479, or Costanzo da Ferrara, a court artist at Naples who also sojourned at the Porte, the specificity of detail in the Seated Scribe leaves little doubt that the artist drew from life.

Once the debate over attribution subsides, the more intriguing issue to raise is whether one can call the work a portrait. Might western pictorial realism have been the point of the exercise? A pronounced crease just above the youth’s elbow suggests the image was initially handled as a loose-leaf, autonomous work of art before being mounted (and in this way preserved) in a sixteenth-century album. Like other western-style works Mehmed II commissioned or obtained during his sultanate, the Seated Scribe may have been used as a pedagogic tool for rising artists of the Ottoman royal workshop. A slightly later copy of the miniature (Freer Gallery of Art, Washington) certainly affirms its value for Ottoman and Persian artists as a pictorial model worthy of imitation. If the pictured youth is not a scribe but an artist, shown in the act of drawing while he himself is being drawn according to Western pictorial practices, the Seated Scribe taught by poignant example – it sits indeed at the nexus of Ottoman art and European traditions of representation.

Source: Susan Spinale, “A Seated Scribe,” in Eye of the Beholder, edited by Alan Chong et al. (Boston: ISGM and Beacon Press, 2003): 97.

Voltaire on Tolerance


Allegorical bust of Voltaire; from 1901 text

One of the vexing paradoxes of modernity is whether or not intolerance can be tolerated. Should dictators be cuddled if they play up to the foreign policy concerns of a democracy? Should anyone — man, woman or child — be forced to live by religious dogma? How much of the intolerable actions in this world should we tolerate? Some wise words on the problem were offered two and a half centuries ago by the French savant, Voltaire, as brilliantly said in his Philosophical Dictionary. Here is what Voltaire said:

What is tolerance? it is the consequence of humanity. We are all formed of frailty and error; let us pardon reciprocally each other’s folly–that is the first law of nature.

It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster. That admits of no difficulty. But the government! but the magistrates! but the princes! how do they treat those who have another worship than theirs? If they are powerful strangers, it is certain that a prince will make an alliance with them. Franois I., very Christian, will unite with Mussulmans against Charles V., very Catholic. Francois I. will give money to the Lutherans of Germany to support them in their revolt against the emperor; but, in accordance with custom, he will start by having Lutherans burned at home. For political reasons he pays them in Saxony; for political reasons he burns them in Paris. But what will happen? Persecutions make proselytes? Soon France will be full of new Protestants. At first they will let themselves be hanged, later they in their turn will hang. There will be civil wars, then will come the St. Bartholomew; and this corner of the world will be worse than all that the ancients and moderns have ever told of hell.

Madmen, who have never been able to give worship to the God who made you! Miscreants, whom the example of the Noachides, the learned Chinese, the Parsees and all the sages, has never been able to lead! Monsters, who need superstitions as crows’ gizzards need carrion! you have been told it already, and there is nothing else to tell you-if you have two religions in your countries, they will cut each other’s throat ; if you have thirty religions, they will dwell in peace. Look at the great Turk, he governs Guebres, Banians, Creek Christians, Nestorians, Romans. The first who tried to stir up tumult would be impaled; and everyone is tranquil.

Humanitarianism (?) in Lebanon


bread provided by NGOs to Syrian refugees in the aid kit in Wadi Khaled (Akkar); photograph by Estella Carpi


A practitioner and a researcher assess humanitarianism in today’s Lebanon

By Fiorenzo Conte and Estella Carpi

In our combined effort of providing the perspectives of the practitioner and the researcher, we would like to take as a point of departure Italian scholar Roberto Belloni’s theses according to which humanitarianism, on the one hand, ends up being the short-term substitute for development, and, on the other, tends to reproduce the same cleavages it tries to overcome.

Humanitarianism as a short-term substitute for development

While conducting research and grounded humanitarian work in Lebanon, we have noticed how humanitarianism, while providing increasing quantity of aid, avoids addressing the root causes of Lebanese chronic poverty, administrative anarchy and recurring war-like events. Predominantly Western and Gulf countries have focused their attention on managing the symptoms of the malaise without effectively addressing its causes and hence engaging in the long term.

The humanitarian needs in Lebanon are surely huge for both Syrian refugees and long neglected Lebanese host communities. With the massive influx of Syrian refugees since August 2011, the Lebanese community, living in the poorest regions, has felt the pinch. Indeed, many residents are currently trying to tackle increased expenditures and a drop in income caused by a variety of factors: the closure of the border and the consequent inaccessibility to Syrian cheaper goods through the usual border-cross smuggling; fierce competition in the labor market that has been increased by the presence of Syrian workers; a deteriorating security situation; and reduced access to the agricultural lands strewn with landmines (1).

The situation for Syrians is similarly grim: according to a recent report, more than 50% of Syrian refugees and Lebanese returnees live in substandard conditions, as Lebanese host communities are no longer able to absorb new flows of refugees in their houses. Continue reading Humanitarianism (?) in Lebanon →