Category Archives: Countries

Humanitarianism (?) in Lebanon


bread provided by NGOs to Syrian refugees in the aid kit in Wadi Khaled (Akkar); photograph by Estella Carpi


A practitioner and a researcher assess humanitarianism in today’s Lebanon

By Fiorenzo Conte and Estella Carpi

In our combined effort of providing the perspectives of the practitioner and the researcher, we would like to take as a point of departure Italian scholar Roberto Belloni’s theses according to which humanitarianism, on the one hand, ends up being the short-term substitute for development, and, on the other, tends to reproduce the same cleavages it tries to overcome.

Humanitarianism as a short-term substitute for development

While conducting research and grounded humanitarian work in Lebanon, we have noticed how humanitarianism, while providing increasing quantity of aid, avoids addressing the root causes of Lebanese chronic poverty, administrative anarchy and recurring war-like events. Predominantly Western and Gulf countries have focused their attention on managing the symptoms of the malaise without effectively addressing its causes and hence engaging in the long term.

The humanitarian needs in Lebanon are surely huge for both Syrian refugees and long neglected Lebanese host communities. With the massive influx of Syrian refugees since August 2011, the Lebanese community, living in the poorest regions, has felt the pinch. Indeed, many residents are currently trying to tackle increased expenditures and a drop in income caused by a variety of factors: the closure of the border and the consequent inaccessibility to Syrian cheaper goods through the usual border-cross smuggling; fierce competition in the labor market that has been increased by the presence of Syrian workers; a deteriorating security situation; and reduced access to the agricultural lands strewn with landmines (1).

The situation for Syrians is similarly grim: according to a recent report, more than 50% of Syrian refugees and Lebanese returnees live in substandard conditions, as Lebanese host communities are no longer able to absorb new flows of refugees in their houses. Continue reading Humanitarianism (?) in Lebanon

A new emir for Qatar


Former Emir Hamad with his son Tamim to the right

In 1988, when I was living in Doha and conducting research at the Arab Gulf States Folklore Centre, the emir of what was still a rather sleepy little gas-rich emirate was Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, who had named his son, Hamad bin Khalifa, heir apparent back in 1977. While his father was out of the country in Geneva, in 1995, the son ousted his father in a bloodless coup. The deposed emir lived in France and Abu Dhabi until his return to Qatar in 2004. On Tuesday Shaykh Hamad pre-empted any such repeat performance by one of his eleven sons by naming his son Tamim the new emir and effectively retiring from leadership without having to find a villa in France. Tamim, the son of Hamad’s second wife, Shaykha Mozah, was declared heir apparent back in 2003, so he has been groomed for the job, including education at Sandhurst in England. Emir Tamim already has four children, so the dynasty will not run out of heirs any time soon. Continue reading A new emir for Qatar

Agricultural policy in Yemen’s highlands and lowlands


Terraced fields below al-Saraha in valley of al-Ahjur; photograph by Daniel Martin Varisco

by Zaid Ali Alwazir, La Voix du Yemen, June 9, 2013

Agricultural policy describes a set of laws related to the local farming and imported agricultural products from abroad. These laws are supposed to be implemented to get certain results such as utilizing the land, operating it or stabilizing prices of imported and local products.

Since the start of the “youth revolution” in Yemen, talks about the political and economic reforms got increased without focusing on “the agricultural economy” as if it was not part of the general “economy”. Therefore, no attention was paid by reformers to this issue since their talks had been focusing on “the material economy” such as “taxes”, “Zakat” and others.

“Agricultural economy” is not given the required attention despite the fact that agricultural development would feed the budget with more income, boost up farmers’ capacity to give more and optimize their living standards to ensure their welfare. Continue reading Agricultural policy in Yemen’s highlands and lowlands

The right barnamaj for Egypt

“If your regime is not strong enough to handle a joke, then you don’t have a regime.” Such was the sentiment of satirist Jon Stewart, who made a surprise appearance on the popular Egyptian television comedy show, al-Barnamaj, starring Bassem Youssef. If the Arab Spring protests were not simply an exercise resulting in one kind of intolerance replacing another, then this may be one of the most important lessons to be learned from the prevailing winds of post-people-revolution hopes. Obviously Moubarek did not handle jokes well, nor did Ben Ali, nor Qaddafi, nor Ali Abdullah Salih. Neither does Bashar al-Asad, who is desperately trying not to be the next ex-dictator in the Middle East. But then the ruling parties in the Islamic Republic are not exactly comedy-friendly. Bin Laden was the butt of millions of jokes, but it is hard to imagine him having success as a stand-up comedian.

The irony is that most of the people I have met in Egypt and Yemen are fond of jokes and have a rich tradition making fun of those in power, corrupt regimes and religious hypocrisy. Many have a sharp edge of “othering” one group or another, but some are self-deprecating. Satire has a way of getting to the crux of problems, which is probably why it is so irritating to those in power. Consider the following joke about the Syrian regime of Hafez al-Asad, a joke I heard from a Lebanese friend when Syria was basically in control of much of Lebanon.

The heads of the CIA, the KGB and the Syrian intelligence agency met at a conference and were bragging about their abilities to track down and find terrorists. Continue reading The right barnamaj for Egypt

Yemen’s National Dialogue Behind Closed Doors

by Sama’a al-Hamdani, Atlantic Council, June 17, 2013

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which began on March 18 and just reached the halfway point of its six-month mandate, was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen’s diverse political, social, geographic, and demographic groups to address the most critical issues plaguing the beleaguered country. Unfortunately, the way the dialogue was developed, designed, and directed created intrinsic flaws that may undercut its success. Some argue that the large number of participants and the lack of genuine representation outside of political parties are the reasons it is doomed for failure. Others feel that the process is advancing too quickly, leaving honest reconciliation out of the equation. One of the other major concerns is the lack of clear communication with the Yemeni public, transparency of the proceedings, and oversight of expenditures.

Although some Yemen experts remain pessimistic about the future of the country, they refrain from critiquing the dialogue because the outcome is still unclear and many perceive the dialogue as the only way to prevent a descent into civil war. Particularly because the process is opaque and because there is genuine skepticism about the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition agreement and the dialogue itself, the NDC should pro-actively report on all working group and plenary proceedings, publish all records and modifications, and disclose all financial contributions and allocations. This is the time to measure the discrepancy between the dialogue’s stated intention and the reality on the ground, if there is hope for effective progress. Continue reading Yemen’s National Dialogue Behind Closed Doors