Category Archives: “Arab Spring”

Islam, a religion of peace

By Timothy Daniels, Guest Contributor, New Mandala, October 6, 2014

There appears to be no end to the war between several western powers—leaders in the global capitalist world order—and Muslim militants. Both sides are spiralling into some form of mutually assured destruction. Fragile “modern” nation-states, formed under the influence of European colonial forces in the early twentieth century, are crumbling and revealing their inability to deliver the promised fruits of secular modernity. Millions of Muslims are being killed, thousands are fleeing for their lives, and centuries old sites of Islamic civilisations are being decimated, while war-stressed western economies are declining into the shadows of China’s great industrial leap forward.

In the face of the current phase of this violent confrontation ushered in by the emergence and establishment of a militant-led Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, many officials of western governments and Muslim leaders are making public statements that include the positive representation of Islam as a “religion of peace.” Linguistic anthropologists or any other social scientists seeking to provide a serious scholarly analysis of such discourse would examine the context and what the speakers are trying to do. Here, some of the social meanings of these statements may include efforts to reinforce the peace-loving posture of the majority of Muslims and to calm the fears of non-Muslims, many of whom have already begun to resort to acts of violence against fellow citizens perceived to be Muslims. However, this scholarly tack is not the approach Clive Kessler chose.

Clive Kessler, a Columbia University trained Emeritus Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of New South Wales, chose to interrogate the truth value of discourse expressing the positive representation of Islam “as a religion of peace.” In the article, “The Islamic State and ‘Religion of Peace,’” published online in the Quadrant on September 26, 2014, Kessler tells us that he finds this description of Islam to be “bland, disingenuous, intellectually lazy, delusional, politically evasive, and altogether simplistic.” He wants us to have a clear idea of what we’re confronted with in order to devise an “effective response.”
Continue reading Islam, a religion of peace

WWJD after a touchdown

Anyone who has watched NFL or NCAA football or listened to interviews with major football players will find a large amount of talking about Jesus. Tim Tebow, the Florida quarterback went so far as to inscribe Bible verses on his forehead. Jesus talk, like trash talk, is as much a part of the game as fighting in hockey. But heaven (and you know which one I mean) forbid if you have a Muslim name, pick off a pass by a Patriot like Tom Brady, scoot into the endzone and slide into a position that for literally three seconds looks like the Muslim prayer position. This happened to Kansas City Chiefs player Husain Abdullah in Sunday’s game. If he had raised his hands and said “Thank you, Jesus” the refs would not have batted an eye, but if he has a Muslim name he must not be allowed to look like he might be praying. Who knows how many ISIL terrorists would be inspired by such an act! Thus, a 15 yard penalty, but it is more than that.

On top of the prejudice, whether premediated or not, the ref has a very poor understanding of how Muslims pray. The most important part of prayer is intention. A Muslim prepares for prayer with ablutions and with a mindset that is focused on the spiritual. Running into the endzone is a thrill and one can understand the excitement of Husain as he slid on his knees. But anyone who looks at the video can see that he was not actually praying. Prayer is a ritual with stages, not what position you end up in at the end of a slide. It was no more a literal religious act than a “Thank you Jesus” would be. Continue reading WWJD after a touchdown

Here come the Huthis…

Are the Houthis a symptom of regional mistrust?

by Abdullah Hammidaddin, alarabiya.net, Saturday, 20 September 2014

Ten years ago this month Ali Saleh had ordered the field execution of Husayn al-Houthi. This was after a three-month war between government forces and Husayn’s supporters in a remote village in northern Yemen. At the time, Husayn’s supporters were few and I believe the matter could have ended there. But Saleh decided to push on and confront the rest of Husayn’s family who then reacted by picking up arms again. They ended up surviving five wars waged by the government. Today Abdulmalik al-Houthi – Husayn’s younger brother – has forces in Sanaa and this time he is threating the Yemeni government, forcing it to make concessions.

In the past year alone, the Houthis have altered the political landscape of Yemen. They pushed the Ahmar family out of their homes and overthrew their three hundred year sheikhdom and authority in the tribal federation of Hashid. They took the al-Jawf area as a strategic last stronghold for their adversaries. They’ve forged alliances with most tribes in the northern region and also in the south. And now in Sanaa they are fighting against both the militias of the Islah party (Muslim Brotherhood branch in Yemen) and military factions loyal to General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar in what could escalate into a major war in the fragile capital city. Continue reading Here come the Huthis…

Islamism beyond the Muslim Brotherhood


At a juice bar in Cairo, two men posed by a photograph of Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi. The general has become a popular figure among many Egyptians; Narciso Contreras for The New York Times

The future of Egyptian democracy: Islamism beyond the Muslim Brotherhood

by Yasmin Moll, The Immanent Flame, August 29

A few weeks after the ouster of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi in 2013, the New York Times ran this headline: “Egyptian Liberals Embrace the Military, Brooking No Dissent.” The accompanying photograph showed a man with a full beard and shaved moustache in the Salafi style, a prominent prayer mark (a “raisin” in the Egyptian vernacular) on his forehead. Behind the man is a wallpaper of Muslim pilgrims circumambulating the Kaaba in Mecca. A framed portrait of then-general and coup master Abdel Fattah el-Sisi leans against beige tiles stickered with several Qur’anic verses. The headline limits the military’s support base to (secular) liberals, while the image shows us it actually extends beyond this narrow stratum.

With some exceptions, such as analyses published in this series, most scholarly accounts dovetail with media framings of Egypt’s fraught political scene since the 2011 revolution as primarily a struggle between secularism and Islamism. But the “secularism versus Islamism” narrativ­e is a political one—it performs important legitimizing labor for a plethora of social actors in Egypt, from the Brotherhood­ to deposed dictator Hosni Mubarak’s allies and both liberal and leftist activists alike. It is, however, of very limited analytical utility in making critical sense of what is actually at stake in the current impasse for the many Egyptians who do not subscribe to a secularized conception of government, yet whose religiosity cannot be conflated with the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood. Continue reading Islamism beyond the Muslim Brotherhood

Is ISIS here to stay?

In a recent article just published in the London Review of Books, Patrick Cockburn, a veteran reporter on the Middle East, paints a disturbing picture of the rise and spread of ISIS. He notes that this zealous group now controls, in one way or another, a swathe of Syria and Iraq greater in area that Great Britain and including six million people. Here is his blunt assessment:

The birth of the new state is the most radical change to the political geography of the Middle East since the Sykes-Picot Agreement was implemented in the aftermath of the First World War. Yet this explosive transformation has created surprisingly little alarm internationally or even among those in Iraq and Syria not yet under the rule of Isis. Politicians and diplomats tend to treat Isis as if it is a Bedouin raiding party that appears dramatically from the desert, wins spectacular victories and then retreats to its strongholds leaving the status quo little changed. Such a scenario is conceivable but is getting less and less likely as Isis consolidates its hold on its new conquests in an area that may soon stretch from Iran to the Mediterranean.

While Cockburn is right to say that insufficient attention has been paid to the rapid rise of this radical group, it is premature to think this is the most radical change since the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the end of World War I. A lot of change has shaped the Middle East in the past century, not least the establishment of Israel. ISIS is not an Ibn Khaldunian Bedouin ghazwa about to overthrow either Syria or Iraq. Nor do self-proclaimed Mahdis and Caliphs have a chance to endure in the modern era. As Cockburn notes, there is a loose alliance of the hardcore ISIS group with local Sunni groups in Iraq opposed to the rule of President Nouri al-Maliki, who is likely to be replaced in the near future. Few of these tribes would welcome the ISIS rules of conduct. To be sure, the Iraqi army trained by the United States is inept to an extraordinary degree, but any attack of armored cars and tanks without air support on Baghdad would be foolhardy.

I am not a prophet, nor do I wish to be, but it is hard to imagine that ISIS can continue to advance without air support and more than captured weapons from retreating Iraqi military. As the U.S. has now begun bombing ISIS targets, they will have a difficult time using the captured tanks. The Kurds may have been pushed back from their border, but even Saddam with his superior weaponry was never able to take control of Kurdistan. Nor will the Western powers watch on the sidelines if ISIS did continue to make serious inroads. Nor will Iran, which has military prowess, allow the vehemently anti-Shia ISIS to move close to the Iranian border. The ISIS blitzkrieg has about as much chance for success as Saddam’s ill-fated attack on Khuzistan after the fall of the Shah. While the success of ISIS thus far will fill their ranks, these will be amateurs, not trained (even poorly trained) soldiers.

The seeds of self-destruction are rife in ISIS with its extreme antagonism to other Muslims, Christians and Yazidis, its draconian ideas for applying medieval punishments, the blatant sexism that includes raping women (imagine if any of the raiders in the time of Muhammad came back and reported having raped enemy women…), and inability to ever gain acceptance by major outside powers. ISIS does not present a viable form of Islam as it plays on the distorted sectarian conflict that has riven Iraq since the disastrous American intervention. Before long ISIS will be a footnote to the ongoing conflict in the region.

ISIS right now is indeed a nightmare, but the devastating impact goes beyond the people brutally slaughtered and the human rights violated. ISIS is about the worst possible thing that can happen for most Muslims. The billion and a half Muslims in the world are a diverse group stretching across ethnic groups and nation states, but very few are extreme jihadists or support a return to a medieval caliphate. Anyone who actually knows the history of the caliphate would hardly want to return to such a corrupt and unstable system of government. The damage that ISIS is doing to the perception of Islam in the West is as bad, perhaps even worse, than that of Osama Bin Laden’s attack on the Twin Towers. ISIS is a godsend to Islamophobes, who constantly focus on this kind of violence as an essential part of Islam. The fact that ISIS does not have support from major Islamic leaders or groups does not matter.

It is obvious that the rebel leader al-Baghdadi has little regard for the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who would never have condoned the kind of violence that ISIS is perpetrating. This is a political battle covered with a hateful religious veneer. Al-Baghdadi will meet his fate, no doubt in the near future, but it will not be in paradise. ISIS is not here to stay, but the damage it can do is a sad commentary on the endemic violence that has engulfed much of the Middle East and abused the image of Islam.

Saving Syria’s Antiquities

The turmoil and ruthless slaughter that is destroying both lives and heritage in Syria has multiple consequences. Beyond the humanitarian crisis, which is huge, there is widespread looting of antiquities in a country where there is a valuable heritage. Dr. Amr Al-Azm has started a campaign to save these antiquities. Details below. Click here to sign the petition to the UN.

Treasures from our museums and ancient cities in Syria are being looted and destroyed, falling victim to the war’s blind aggression. My former archeology students are working diligently and risking their lives to protect our country’s cultural heritage.

It’s important that our heritage is preserved, not only for its intrinsic beauty and historical value, but also because it helps us reconstruct Syrian identity. Now, the market for stolen artefacts is in the millions, but one important thing can make a difference.

The UN must ban the trade in Syrian artefacts.

So far they have ignored numerous calls to push through a resolution as they did in the past to protect Iraq’s heritage, but there’s something much larger at stake now that should get them to act. Looting Syria’s history is big business and the extremist group known as ISIS have added millions of dollars to their war chest because of it.

Syrians are now not only watching their history being torn down and sold to foreign buyers, but they’re having that money turned against them in the form of more weapons.

— Dr. Amr Al-Azm

Associate Professor of Middle East History, Shawnee University
Professor at the University of Damascus (1998-2006)
Director of Science and Conservation Laboratories at the General Department of Antiquities and Museums in Syria (1999-2004)

On The Moral Hazards of Field Research in Middle East Politics

By Sheila Carapico, Middle East Research and Information Project, July 1, 2014

* This memo was prepared as part of the “Ethics and Research in the Middle East” symposium

American political scientists studying the Middle East face ethical dilemmas not shared by most of our disciplinary colleagues. Sometimes – perhaps unexpectedly – our presence in countries or communities experiencing repression and/or political violence puts our local colleagues, hosts, or contacts at risk by association. The massive U.S. military footprint and widespread mistrust of U.S. policies and motives multiplies the risks to our interlocutors.

The trademark methodology of American Arabists is fieldwork, meaning, in political science, in-depth interviews, participant observation, data collection, document-gathering, opinion polling, political mapping, and recording events. As sojourners but not permanent residents, we rely heavily on the wisdom, networks, and goodwill of counterparts “on the ground,” particularly other intellectuals.

In any environment where agencies of national, neighboring, and U.S. governments are all known to be gathering intelligence, our research projects may look and sound like old-fashioned espionage. Even under the very best of circumstances (which are rather scarce) a lot of people are wary or suspicious of all Americans, including or sometimes especially Arabic speakers who ask a lot of questions and take notes. Immediate acquaintances probably grasp and trust our inquiries. Their neighbors or nearby security personnel may not. It is common knowledge that at least some spies and spooks come in academic disguise and that some U.S.-based scholars sell their expertise to the CIA or the Pentagon. Instead of treating whispered gossip as the product of mere paranoia or conspiracy theories, we need to recognize its objective and sociological underpinnings. Continue reading On The Moral Hazards of Field Research in Middle East Politics