By Yousef Munayyer, Palestine Center, The Jerusalem Fund, February 14, 2011

Thirty years ago the Soviet Union was at the beginning of a long campaign in Afghanistan, the average person was lucky to have an advanced recording technology called a “VHS tape,” and Mohammad Hosni Mubarak took control of Egypt, the most populous nation in the Arab Middle East. This week, the last of these beginnings came to an end when millions of Egyptian protestors succeeded in toppling one of the longest standing rulers in the 5,000-year history of Egypt.

But as with all eras, Hosni Mubarak’s established norms, some national and others regional, which have now irreversibly changed. What type of government may take form in Egypt in the coming weeks and months is yet to be seen, however, it is highly unlikely that any new government can afford to repeat the mistakes of the previous regime which eliminated pluralistic political participation in the formulation of both domestic and foreign policy.

Many different global players had an investment in the outcome of the drama that finally concluded in Egypt with Mubarak’s departure. So after this transformational moment, who are the winners and who are the losers?

The Winners

1. The People of Egypt – After only 18 days, the people of Egypt succeeded in removing a ruler who had governed Egypt for three decades. But the victory for the people of Egypt is far greater than the removal of one person like Mubarak or his family. The fall of Mubarak means the fall of various other players who had been involved in central roles in Mubarak’s political party and have used this power to garner wealth while half of Egypt’s population lived below the poverty line. The extent to which the people of Egypt remain in the winner’s category depends on what happens from this day forward. Transfer of power from an octogenarian dictator to the “supreme military council” is not exactly democratic reform. The next few weeks and months will determine if the generals now in control of Egypt will be willing to genuinely cede power back to the people, and – if this process comes to fruition – if Egypt’s future will be bright.

2. The Palestinian People (Especially in Gaza) – For several years, the Mubarak regime has played a direct role in the coordinated siege of Gaza. The siege has, of course, had a devastating effect on the economic status and humanitarian needs in Gaza, and has effectively led to the collective punishment of Gaza’s civilian population. The siege has been a major rallying point among Arabs and Muslims and people of conscience around the world who have been appalled by the callous treatment of a largely civilian population, and it should go without saying that Egypt’s role in this siege was wildly unpopular in Egypt itself. The regime regularly began demonizing elements in Gaza – creating a boogeyman – to justify the siege among its population as a national security interest. Only days before the fall of the regime, the detested Ministry of Interior, now under house arrest, blamed the horrific bombing of a church in Alexandria, which risked the onset of sectarian violence, on Palestinians from Gaza.

A democratic Egypt, or at least an Egypt which must account for popular sentiment in its foreign policy making, is highly unlikely to cooperate with the Israeli siege of Gaza. Certainly, Israeli and American pressures to maintain this policy will persist regardless of what government is formed, but this newly displayed and remarkable popular outcry will factor heavily into the state’s decision calculus in a way that didn’t exist before. The Palestinian people, especially those in Gaza for whom Egypt and the Rafah crossing are the only access to the outside world, may finally find relief from the ongoing struggle to secure food and fuel, and travel without threat of prolonged imprisonment or death in a smuggling tunnel.

3. Al Jazeera – The Qatari-backed satellite news network, which was already the most popular news outlet in the Arab world, took tremendous steps forward during this transformational moment. Not only did Al Jazeera’s English and Arabic language networks have the best coverage of all other regional networks, they had the best coverage of the situation throughout the world. While most networks were asleep at the control room, Al Jazeera had reporters on the ground in Tahrir Square from the onset covering the event live from every angle and in both languages. This advantage caused various American news networks to rely on Al Jazeera footage and reporters, and, in a rather rare occurrence, the overall narrative on Al Jazeera was mimicked by major news networks in the United States. For all the credit given to the internet and social media, one must note that when Mubarak hit the internet kill switch, the world relied on Al Jazeera to see what was happening in Egypt. This was coupled with an amazing surge in visits to Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English websites where viewers from around the world went to watch live coverage.

But Al Jazeera is also in the winner’s column because the biggest individual loser, Mubarak, expressly made Al Jazeera his enemy. While most journalists were targeted by the regime’s crackdown, Al Jazeera’s crew came under significant pressure and their offices in Cairo were set on fire. The network’s satellite signal was jammed by the regime in the very early days of the uprising and it was forced to change its frequency numerous times. And while the regime was resisting the demands of the people, both Hosni Mubarak and Omar Suleiman repeatedly blamed “outside influence” and specifically warned people not to watch “satellite channels” clearly referring to Al Jazeera. Ultimately, when news finally came that Mubarak was stepping down, most Egyptians, Arabs and many others around the world watched it live on the Al Jazeera network.

The Losers

1. The Palestinian Authority – It was only days before the January 25th revolution began that Palestinian Authority (PA) officials were making the exact same argument about Al Jazeera that the Mubarak regime was making in its last throws. Al Jazeera was airing an exposé on the “Palestine Papers,” documents from behind closed-door negotiations between Israel and the PA that thoroughly embarrassed the Ramallah-based authority, and led Chief Negotiator Saeb Erakat to resign. In response, the PA told Palestinians not to listen to Al Jazeera and argued that the network and the outside forces which control them were attempting a coup against the PA.

But it is not simply the PA’s being on the Mubarak side of Al Jazeera which places them in the loser column. The PA relied heavily on the Mubarak regime for several things and it entrusted Mubarak and his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman to handle any negotiations between them and their political rivals Hamas. The reason that the PA was so enthralled by Mubarak’s regime is perhaps best illuminated by a Wikileak-ed State Department cable where Suleiman “explained that Egypt’s three primary objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.”

Even during the final days of the Mubarak regime, the PA’s security apparatus repressed demonstrations in Ramallah being held in solidarity with the Egyptian people. Shortly after the crowds were dispersed and some of their members arrested, a pro-Mubarak demonstration was permitted to take place. There is little doubt that that the PA was worried that their best friend in the region maybe going on permanent vacation. With a post-Mubarak Egypt, which is unlikely to operate as the old Egypt did, the PA will be increasingly lonely in a region which has grown skeptical of the U.S.-backed regime in Ramallah.

2. Israel – Egypt was Israel’s biggest strategic military threat before a peace agreement was signed between the two in 1979. Since then, an Egypt led by Mubarak had become Israel’s best friend in the region and cooperated with Israel on the siege of Gaza, but also other strategic and military endeavors. A more democratic Egypt will likely not mean the end to the 1979 Camp David peace accords. Surely, there will be plenty of American pressure on Cairo to make sure that this is the case. But the days of close Egyptian-Israeli security coordination are likely as much a part of the history books as Mubarak himself.

It is not simply the change in the Israeli-Egyptian relationship which will negatively impact Tel Aviv. The impact of the successful overthrow of Mubarak will spread throughout the region which means Arab publics throughout the region will feel empowered – a thought that makes Israeli leaders shiver. Few things have benefited Israeli security more than pacified Arab publics. Moreover, if Egypt’s official posture turns away from Israel as expected, it is likely to make things increasingly more uncomfortable for another of Israel’s neighbors, Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom, which signed peace with Israel in 1994, may now be Israel’s only friend in the region. With Turkey’s realignment away from Israel in recent years, and now Egypt’s transformation toward democracy, Jordan will find it more difficult to deflect regional and domestic criticism of security cooperation with Israel and maybe forced to adjust its position as well.

3. Saudi Arabia and other “moderates” – Like most around the world, Saudi Arabia was caught off guard by the events which took place in Tunisia leading to the overthrow of Zein Al-Abidine Ben Ali. When no one else would take the first modern Arab dictator to be deposed, Saudi Arabia offered him refuge. But the last thing Saudi Arabia wanted was to start a collection, and it was critical for the United States’ oldest ally in the region that what happened in Tunisia stayed in Tunisia. Tunisia could be explained away as a rare event, but if Mubarak fell, the domino effect would be undeniable and the reverberations would head throughout the Middle East.

When the United States began to distance itself from Mubarak, the Saudis notably objected calling on the United States to handle Mubarak with care. Then, when Washington began to question their $1.3 billion in aid to Egypt, the Saudis announced that if U.S. aid to the regime was cut off, they’d be happy to step in and replace it.

In the end, of course, Mubarak stepped down and the revolution in Egypt achieved similar results to the revolution in Tunisia less than a month earlier. Saudi Arabia now has the unique reputation of being the regime which stuck by the most unpopular man in the region up to the very last minute. Mubarak was also a key member in an axis of “moderate” states, which is the typology used in Washington to describe allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen (and previously Egypt and Tunisia), and has little to do with the actual political temperament of the states. This “moderate” axis often had to deflect criticism for unpopular policies in support of U.S. objectives. Now, this collective has lost its most strategically important member in Mubarak, who projected the narrative and interests of the “moderates” in his policy toward Israel/Palestine, the conflict which has helped define politics in the Arab world for the better part of a century.

4. The Global Sectarians – From Islamophobes here in the United States who rejected pro-democracy demonstrations in Egypt arguing that this is the beginning of a new caliphate, to radical extremists who have targeted Christian minorities in the Middle East, the global sectarians who preach a narrative of tension between faiths in the region suffered a significant blow. Images of Egypt’s Copts alongside Egypt’s Muslims calling for a new regime put an end to the Mubarak-sponsored myth that a strong-armed dictator was desired for the implementation of secularism. While the secular Arab nationalism that swept the region in the early post-colonial period relied on Arab identity as its backbone, what we are seeing today even transcends that commonality. The unity of protestors of different faiths in Tahrir square showed that Christians and Muslims in the region had more in common than just an Arab or Egyptian identity; they also equally yearned for freedom and were ready to pay the ultimate price for it. This is not to say that religious minorities have no concerns about the future of Egypt, but this newly demonstrated unity can lay the foundations of a state with strong respect for civil and religious rights.

In Between

The United States – The jury is still out on whether the United States is a winner or a loser after the revolution in Egypt. President Obama made an important statement after Mubarak stepped down calling the events in Egypt “historic” and saying “The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same…. The United States will continue to be a friend and partner to Egypt.” But despite President Obama’s world-renowned oratory skills, it is not likely the people of Egypt will forget the United States’ 30 years of support for the regime which repressed them, especially since tear-gas canisters labeled “Made in the USA” were just recently used against them.

The relationship between Egypt and the United States will depend on what happens from this day forward. The United States must not only be a friend and partner to Egypt, but it must also not interfere in Egypt’s democracy and respect its new found independence if the new government is less aligned with U.S. and Israeli interests than the last one was. Only time will tell how the United States will respond when Egypt reaches that inevitable juncture.

Yousef Munayyer is Executive Director of the Palestine Center. This policy brief may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Center.

The views in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund.