Open Letter to a Democratic President

by Richard W. Bulliet

January 21, 2009

Congratulations on your inauguration. May history remember your term in
office as the greatest political turn-around in American history.

Now to Iraq, the puzzle your predecessor has left for you to solve:

1. Compounding one botched war in Iraq with a second one in Iran would
sink your presidency before it starts. President Ahmadinejad of the
Islamic Republic of Iran will be up for reelection in seven months (August
2009). The Iranian people must be given an unfettered opportunity to
retire him to private life and elect someone of more liberal temperament.
His unpopularity in Iran already points in that direction. So, the United
States should do nothing that would enhance his prospects of reelection.
Diplomacy must replace saber rattling, and the “axis of evil” rhetoric
must be retired. Let us do what we can to give the Iranians a chance to
change leaders through their own electoral system.

2. Begin immediately the relocation of combat units to bases outside the
major cities of Iraq as a first step toward the withdrawal of ground
forces from the country. Announce that combat operations will henceforth
be restricted to fighting against those who attack American troops, supply
lines, or physical assets. Open negotiations with the Iraqi government
about the possibility of leaving a small number of combat units in the
country for a fixed and limited period to interdict the infiltration of
foreign fighters and — in joint operations with the Iraqi army — combat
groups that both the United States and the Iraqi government agree are
primarily composed of foreign terrorists.

3. Withdraw three combat brigades every four months, and redeploy most of
them outside the Middle East. Pack up and send home ordinance, vehicles,
and other movable equipment at a rate commensurate with the rate of
withdrawal. Discuss with the Iraqi government the optimum disposition of
immovable base assets, including destruction as an option. Publicize this
policy as a process with interim target dates but with no irreversible
completion date. Stress that the steady dismantling of bases is the best
indicator of our intention to withdraw completely.

4. Continue to train the Iraqi army and negotiate suitable levels of
armament and logistic capability. Since internal disorder may increase as
American forces withdraw, make it clear that the United States has no
intention of arming one side in a civil war. This is particularly
important insofar as Sunni groups that have worked with Americans in
improving security in areas poorly controlled by the government should not
feel that we are leaving them to be slaughtered by overwhelming firepower
in the hands of the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army should not be given, or
trained to use, tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery,
surface-to-air missiles, or other major weapons systems. The Iraqi air
force should be limited to light planes and helicopters designed for
reconnaissance and transport purposes only.

5. Explore the idea of a regional agreement to demilitarize Iraqi
airspace. Continuing indefinitely to maintain air supremacy over Iraq
could undermine the political and psychological benefits of withdrawing
American ground forces. Iraq and its neighbors — Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Jordan, and Turkey — should be encouraged to negotiate an Iraqi
airspace agreement by which the signatories would agree not to overfly
Iraq with warplanes, or stage air attacks on Iraqi territory, for the
duration of the agreement. NATO or the United Nations should be asked to
supply personnel to man radar sites in Iraqi territory and a squadron of
warplanes to escort any interloping aircraft out of Iraq.

6. It is possible that a credible Iraq withdrawal plan will help break the logjam that prevents the factions within the Iraqi government from finding common ground. Announcing that American patience with a political stalemate is not inexhaustible — but never saying what the consequences of American patience being exhausted would be — has certainly had the opposite effect. A solid bipartisan agenda in Washington can help as well. The last administration called on the Iraqi parliamentary majority to respect and conciliate the minority. But the Republicans in Washington took the opposite position vis-à-vis the Democrats. The administration further wanted Iraq’s oil wealth to be shared for the benefit of all Iraqis. But at home it showered favors on rich Americans at the expense of ordinary families. Finally, the administration wanted to keep Iraq united. But its policies repeatedly exacerbated Red State-Blue State divisions in the interest of maintaining power. It is time to end the hypocrisy of asking others to uphold democratic values that we ourselves flout.

7. If civil disorder intensifies in the wake of a staged American withdrawal of ground forces, the United States should continue to respect the elected government, urge that elections be held on schedule, and participate in election monitoring to assure the Iraqi people that we continue to care about their political process. However, American military forces should refrain from intervening in combat between rival factions. The Lebanon civil war demonstrated that intervention either bloodies the nose of the intervening parties (e.g., Israel and the United States) or dooms that successful intervener (e.g., Syria) to endless and debilitating military occupation.

Since you have four years in which to make a case for your reelection, everything need not be done at once. What is important is to make it clear that a process of withdrawal is in place, and that that process will continue regardless of the success or failure of the Iraqi government in solving its factional problems within parliament and on the ground. The fine line that must be trod is between assuring Americans that a continued concern with groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and with domestic security, and assuring the rest of the world that the nightmare of neoconservative imperialism and runaway presidential power is over.

Sincerely yours,
Richard W. Bulliet
Professor of History
Columbia University

Richard Bulliet is Professor of History at Columbia University and author of Islam: The View from the Edge and The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization.

Copyright © 2007 Richard Bulliet / Agence Global