Category Archives: Ali Abdullah Salih

Lessons in Yemeni Machiavellianism

by Samaa Al Hamdani, Fikra Forum, February 20

[For this article in Arabic, click here.)

Last September, a rebel militia known as the Houthis successfully captured large portions of Yemen’s north and its capital, Sana. A few months later, in January 2015, President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi and his government resigned following clashes with the Houthis. By February 10, diplomatic missions in Sana’a had evacuated the country to protest the “illegitimate Houthi takeover.” Overnight, the Houthis became Yemen’s new rulers, but very little was known about them.

The enigmatic Houthi movement transformed from a Zaydi revivalist group in the early 1990s, to a rebel movement in the mid-1990s, to an enemy warring against the Yemeni state in the early 2000s. Following the revolution in 2011, the Houthis secured 33 seats in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), because they had significant local influence and were considered victims of the former regime. The Houthis were granted a specialized committee in the NDC solidifying them as an influential political player. However, as soon as the dialogue concluded, the Houthis lost faith in the internationally backed political transition. Since then, the Houthis – led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi – have employed Machiavellian tactics to gain influence in Yemen, taking advantage of the dismal performance of Hadi’s National Unity Government to seize territory and power.

In September 2014 Hadi lifted fuel subsidies, which angered much of the Yemeni population and provided an opening for the Houthis. Cleverly, the Houthis sided with the people against the government; thereafter, within six days, they seized the capital. Months later, on February 11, they mobilized mass protests to overshadow any activities by the opposition. It is likely that a Houthi-led protest will take place on March 18, the anniversary of the “Friday of Dignity,” during which 56 protestors were killed in 2011. By hijacking public rallies, the Houthis aim to silence the opposition and, in this specific case, avoid criticism by the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United Nations Security Council.
Continue reading Lessons in Yemeni Machiavellianism

Yet more change in Arabia


President Hadi of Yemen, left; King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, right

In the space of 24 hours two countries on the Arabian Peninsula have seen a change, or at least anticipated change, in leadership. Yesterday President Hadi of Yemen, his Prime Minister Khaled Baha and the entire cabinet resigned after bowing to demands made by the Huthi leadership. The complicated political system ensures or at least suggests that he must remain in power for at least three months, although what power he actually has is severely limited. Not long after midnight King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia passed away at the estimated age of 90. The new Saudi monarch is Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who is 79, with Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz as the new crown prince. Given the fact that Sultan Qabus of Oman is in his mid 70s further change is possible as the years roll by. Qatar and the Emirates have relatively young rulers, so their stability does not appear to be in question.

Yemen is in free fall politically. The Huthis have taken control of most of the northern highlands and the capital city Sanaa, while they continue to battle local tribes in Marib and the Jawf. Hirak has, at least in spirit, seceded from the once-touted wahda. Al-Qaeda continues its attacks on Yemen’s military and the Huthis, while there are now reports that ISIS/ISIL is trying to muscle into Yemen as well. Hadramawt has also removed itself from any central authority. Only Socotra remains isolated from the potential for violence. This political quagmire is even murkier due to the behind-the-scenes (and at times quite overt) maneuvering of former President Ali Abdullah Salih, who remains a potent force and appears to have ambitions of regaining power. Yemen has no functioning government, the economy has ground to a halt, foreign aid from the Saudis has all but ceased and there are daily clashes that take the lives of ordinary Yemeni citizens. Yemen has not become another Iraq or Syria, but it is teetering on the brink. Continue reading Yet more change in Arabia

Here come the Huthis…

Are the Houthis a symptom of regional mistrust?

by Abdullah Hammidaddin, alarabiya.net, Saturday, 20 September 2014

Ten years ago this month Ali Saleh had ordered the field execution of Husayn al-Houthi. This was after a three-month war between government forces and Husayn’s supporters in a remote village in northern Yemen. At the time, Husayn’s supporters were few and I believe the matter could have ended there. But Saleh decided to push on and confront the rest of Husayn’s family who then reacted by picking up arms again. They ended up surviving five wars waged by the government. Today Abdulmalik al-Houthi – Husayn’s younger brother – has forces in Sanaa and this time he is threating the Yemeni government, forcing it to make concessions.

In the past year alone, the Houthis have altered the political landscape of Yemen. They pushed the Ahmar family out of their homes and overthrew their three hundred year sheikhdom and authority in the tribal federation of Hashid. They took the al-Jawf area as a strategic last stronghold for their adversaries. They’ve forged alliances with most tribes in the northern region and also in the south. And now in Sanaa they are fighting against both the militias of the Islah party (Muslim Brotherhood branch in Yemen) and military factions loyal to General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar in what could escalate into a major war in the fragile capital city. Continue reading Here come the Huthis…

Yemeni Federalism: The Fix is Six

Yemen is about to shrink administratively, but there is hope for a resolution of the ongoing insecurity in the wake of the Arab spring toppling of Ali Abdullah Salih, who ruled Yemen for more than three decades. One result of the National Dialogue Conference is a recommendation that Yemen become a federalist state with six regions to replace the former major regional units. As described in the official Saba News agency of the Yemeni government, the existing governorates would be assigned as follows:

• Hadramout will include al-Mahra, Hadramawt, Shabwa and Socotra, with al-Muklâ as its capital.

• Saba will include al-Jawf, Ma’rib and Al-Baydha, with Marib as its capital.

• Aden will comprise Aden, Abyan, Lahj and Dhala‘, with the capital in Aden.

• Janad will comprise Taiz and Ibb, with Taiz as a capital.

• Azal will consist of Sa‘da, San‘a, Amran and Dhamar with the capital to be determined within the former San‘a governorate, but not San‘a city.

• Tihama will include al-Hudayda, Rayma, al-Mahwit and Hajja with its capital in the city of al-Hudayda.

For those who prefer to see the divisions in Arabic, here they are:

الإقليم الأول: محافظات المهرة حضرموت شبوة سقطرى، ويسمى إقليم «حضرموت» وعاصمته المكلا.

الإقليم الثاني: محافظات الجوف مارب البيضاء، ويسمى إقليم «سبأ» وعاصمته «سبأ».

الإقليم الثالث: محافظات عدن ابين لحج الضالع، ويسمى إقليم «عدن» وعاصمته عدن.

الإقليم الرابع: محافظتا تعز إب ويسمى إقليم «الجند» وعاصمته تعز.

الإقليم الخامس: محافظات صعدة صنعاء عمران ذمار، ويسمى إقليم «آزال» وعاصمته صنعاء.

الإقليم السادس: محافظات الحديدة ريمة المحويت حجة، ويسمى إقليم «تهامة» وعاصمته الحديدة.

The plan also calls for the city of San‘a being an independent capital area, perhaps like the District of Columbia in the United States, to guarantee its impartiality. Its geographical extent will be increased by some 40 percent. Aden will also have special status as an economic zone and its geographical extent as a city enlarged. Continue reading Yemeni Federalism: The Fix is Six

Sanctions on the Yemeni Horizon?


Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh (pictured on the poster), is clearly at risk for the imposition of sanctions as his name is mentioned in the draft as a spoiler. (File photo: Reuters)

No Yemen sanctions for now, but schemers be warned

by Talal al-Haj | Special to Al Arabiya News, February 10, 2014

The P3 (U.S., UK and France), with the potential support of Russia and China, are engaged in intensive discussions over the content of a British drafted resolution on Yemen. The draft resolution, seen by Al Arabiya, calls for the creation of a sanctions committee, but does not actually sanction anyone.

If the draft becomes a Security Council resolution, the sanction committee will possess the power to impose travel bans and to freeze the assets of those who hinder the successful completion of the transitional period in Yemen which aims to change the country into a Federal Democratic one.

The draft “welcomes the Yemeni government’s Asset Recovery Law, and supports the efforts of the government and people of Yemen to implement this law.” This excerpt can be interpreted as a clear warning to the men of the old regime ,who engage in any obstructionist effort to hinder the creation of the new Yemen, that they risk having their assets – gathered during their reign of power – recouped for the benefit of the people of Yemen.
An interesting part of the resolution

However, the most interesting part of the resolution remains the creation of a Sanctions Committee under article number 41 of chapter seven, capable of banning the travel or freezing the assets of those who try to “ act to undermine the successful completion of the political transition, as outlined in the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism Agreement, including article 45 of the National Dialogue Conference’s Good Government Working report.” Continue reading Sanctions on the Yemeni Horizon?

Huthis vs. Hashid


Embattled residence of Husayn al-Ahmar

I wish this was a commentary about rival football clubs in Yemen, but it is not. The news this morning is that Huthi forces have battled the tribal guard of the al-Ahmar clan, specifically the home of Husayn of al-Ahmar. Husayn is the son of the late Abdullah al-Ahmar, who passed away in 2007 but had been paramount shaykh of Hashid since the execution of his father by Imam Ahmad. Before the revolution that toppled the Zaydi imamate, the two tribal confederations of Hashid and Bakil were said to be the wings of the imamate, cautiously manipulated by the last dynasty of Zaydi imams in the north. While tribal identity, and more importantly tribal values embedded in an honor code of qabyala, is still of major importance in Yemen today, the importance of Hashid and Bakil as major political blocks has weakened. This is due in part to the efforts of Ali Abdullah Salih, Yemen’s last president, to create loyalty to his regime. But it is also a result of imported views of Islam, including the Saudi-funded Salafis.

Yemen is beset with internal strife, fueled in large part by outside interests. The recent National Dialogue Conference has recommended a resolution to the current political stalemate along the lines of a federalist state. The expansion of Huthi influence closer to the capital may be part of the jousting for position in determining the boundaries of new federal states. Whatever the reason, this escalation of violence only exacerbates the tension that exists between Yemenis in various regions. Assassinations now seem to be almost a daily occurrence and Yemen’s economy has ground to a standstill. It is reported that the agricultural lands near Sa’da have been destroyed due to the fighting there between the Huthis and their foes, both the military excursions that Salih sent and the Salafis based in Dammaj. In this unrest, the feeble AQAP is able to operate with virtual impunity, despite the continued use of drones to target suspected terrorists.

The Riya-lity of Power

Michel Foucault, the French philosopher/historian, is oft quoted for equating knowledge (savoir) with power (pouvoir). Thanks to investigative reporting by Yemeni journalists, we now have knowledge about how Ali Abdullah Salih, the former President of Yemen, used his power to create riyal-ity, that is fabulous wealth skimmed off Yemen’s oil revenues in riyals. As reported in Yemen Press, Salih funneled millions of his wealth to the United Arab Emirates, also having villas built for his family. He has also distributed his vast wealth, as yet unaccounted for, to Morocco, France, Germany and Italy. It is reported that he did not use his own name, but those of family members.

So what else is new? Dictators, like kings and sultans of the past, have always enriched themselves while poor people starved on the streets. The more power tends to be absolute,or near absolute, the more the coffers get filled. Mamluk sultans in Egypt would periodically sack wealthy officials or merchants just to absorb their wealth. While most contemporary states have safeguards to prevent wholesale laundering of a country’s wealth, dictators generally define their own rules. While Asad hangs on to power in embattled Syria, there are no doubt several bank accounts full of cash if he ends up being forced out.

While it is true that there are various kinds of power, positive as well as negative, economics trumps the abstract notion of knowledge. Greed explains more than prejudice, although the two generally go hand in hand. Yemen is a special case in the seasonal shift following the Arab Spring. Continue reading The Riya-lity of Power